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.I. INTRODUCTION
In addition to the powers expressly conferred by law, courts
have certain inherent or implied powers. The inherent powers doc-
trine establishes the implicit right of the judiciary to accomplish
all objectives naturally within its realm, thereby making it possible
for courts to carry out their constitutional responsibilities as an
independent branch of government.1 The courts, in exercising their
inherent powers, must be careful not to invade the sphere of opera-
tion of the other branches of government.2 Before a court uses its
inherent power, it must weigh the benefit to be achieved against
the harm that may result from the use of such power.
This Article analyzes the inherent powers doctrine of the Flor-
ida courts. The inherent powers doctrine is a judicial creature that
the United States Supreme Court authoritatively established in
this country in one of its earliest and most important interpreta-
tions of the federal Constitution. The doctrine has evolved in Flor-
ida as a result of changing judicial perceptions of the scope of the
judiciary's powers and authority.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURTS' USE OF INHERENT
POWERS
A. The Separation of Powers Doctrine
1. THE DOCTRINE'S APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The courts' inherent powers derive from the related concepts
of separation of powers and judicial independence.8 The doctrine
of separation of powers rests on a theory of balance of power; it
evolved from the fear that concentration of power leads to tyranny.
The framers of the United States Constitution were the first to
apply the doctrine, which is rooted in the political thought of Aris-
1. In United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812), the Supreme Court held
that the courts have certain "implied powers." To exercise their judicial powers effectively,
courts must have certain implied (or inherent) powers, such as the power "[tio fine for con-
tempt - imprison for contumacy - inforce the observance of order, .... " Id. at 34. Such
powers "cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of
all others . . . ." Id.; see State ex rel. Ross v. Call, 39 Fla. 504, 22 So. 748 (1897) (supreme
court power to adopt rules of practice necessary to the administration of law is an inherent
power necessarily resulting from the nature of the institution); see also McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), construed in Girardeau v. State, 403 So. 2d 513, 515
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (specific grants of power carry with them inherent powers to facilitate
the exercise of express powers).
2. See White v'.'Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1952).
3. Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978).
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totle, Locke, and Montesquieu, as a workable system of
government."
Among the framers of the Constitution who favored a separa-
tion of powers theory of government, there were differing views re-
garding its practical implementation. Thomas Jefferson and James
Wilson espoused a "rigid" concept of separation of powers whereby
the government would be completely divided into three separate,
tightly compartmentalized departments.' The founding fathers ul-
timately rejected that rigid application of the doctrine.
Instead, the framers accepted the more flexible approach, ex-
pounded by Montesquieu. James Madison embraced Montes-
quieu's theory of separation of powers and argued that a govern-
ment could operate efficiently only if it were made flexible by the
blending of power.' Although Madison recognized that one branch
of government should not control another and that each should
have its own sphere of action, he suggested that the three depart-
ments of government should not be "wholly unconnected with each
other." 7 Each department should be "connected and blended as to
give each a constitutional control over the others." He believed
that such a blending of power would permit each branch of govern-
ment to defend itself against any encroachment by another branch.
Although Madison favored a blending of power, he stated that
the concentration of "all powers, legislative, executive, and judici-
ary, in the same hands. . . may justly be pronounced the very def-
inition of tyranny." He suggested that an independent judiciary
would protect the liberty of the individual against such tyrannical
control. Conversely, he argued that "'[w]ere the power of judging,
joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would
4. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 671 (1980). For
a background of the separation of powers doctrine, see generally A. VANDERBILT, THE Doc-
TRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT DAY SIGNIFICANCE (1953) (congres-
sional interference and judicial deference as causes of constitutional imbalance); Parker,
The Historic Basis of Administrative Law: Separation of Powers and Judicial Supremacy,
12 RUTGERS L. REV. 449 (1958) (the judiciary has succeeded in its claim of sovereignty over
the legislative and executive branches); Sharp The Classical American Doctrine of "The
Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 385 (1935) (historical analysis of the separation of
powers doctrine).
5. See Sharp, supra note 4, at 396, 414.
6. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 48 (J. Madison) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981) (discuss-
ing the need for internal checks on government); see also Sharp, supra note 4, at 407.
7. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 146 (R. Fairchild ed. 1981).
8. Id. (favoring a system of checks and balances).
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 139 (J. Madison) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981); see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 48, at 146, 148 (J. Madison) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981) (discussing the need for
internal checks and the dangerous propensities of a legislative body).
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be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
legislator.' ,"0 Madison quoted Montesquieu, the celebrated judge
and philosopher: "There can be no liberty . . . if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers!"'"
In The Federalist Papers, which were written to defend the
newly proposed constitution, Alexander Hamilton suggested that
the courts should not be forced to depend on the legislature."2 In
observing that "a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a
power over his will,"' Hamilton argued that the complete separa-
tion of judicial from legislative power could not be realized if the
judiciary were left dependent for "pecuniary resources" on the oc-
casional grants of the legislature.' 4
Madison recognized the danger that the legislature might en-
croach on the judiciary by virtue of its power of the purse. He rea-
soned that:
[A]s the legislative department alone has access to the pockets
of the people, and has in some constitutions full discretion, and
in all a prevailing influence, over the pecuniary rewards of those
who fill the other departments, a dependence is thus created in
the latter, which gives still greater facility to encroachments of
the former.16
Madison concluded that the "mere demarcation on parchment of
the constitutional limits of the several departments is not a suffi-
cient guard against those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical
concentration of all the powers of government in the same
hands.""
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 141 (J. Madison) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981) (quoting
Montesquieu).
11. Id. at 140. This concept is said to lie at the heart of Montesquieu's contribution to
political philosophy. Vanderbilt, supra note 4, at 98. Montesquieu recognized that of the
three branches, the judiciary is the least powerful. Sharp, supra note 4, at 390. Because
Montesquieu recognized the relative weakness of the judiciary, he appreciated the impor-
tance of its independence. Vanderbilt, supra note 4, at 97. This may have influenced Alex-
ander Hamilton when he wrote that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the
three departments of power... it can never attack with success either of the other two; and
* . .all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks." THE
FEDERALIST No. 78, at 277 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981).
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 71, at 207 (J. Madison) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981).
13. THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 234 (A. Hamilton) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981) (emphasis in
original).
14. Id.
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 148 (J. Madison) (R. Fairchild ed. 1981).
16. 'Id. at 151. Although the federal Constitution has no express separation of powers
clause, case law firmly establishes that one branch of government cannot usurp or interfere
[Vol. 39:257
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2. THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The founding fathers also debated whether courts should have
the power of judicial review." The issue of judicial review was not
finally laid to rest until the Supreme Court's historic decision in
Marbury v. Madison,1s which' involved a separation of powers con-
frontation.1" The facts were as follows: William Marbury and three
others moved the Supreme Court of the United States for a rule to
show cause why a mandamus should not issue commanding James
Madison, Secretary of State, to delivery their commissions as jus-
tices of the peace in the District of Columbia.20 Affidavits support-
ing the motion showed that President Adams nominated the appli-
cants and that, upon the advice and consent of the Senate, the
President signed the commissions and the Secretary of State af-
fixed the seal of the United States.21 The commissions, however,
were not delivered prior to the inauguration of President Thomas
Jefferson, and Mr. Madison failed to respond to requests to deliver
them.2
The Supreme Court, in a decision that Chief Justice Marshall
authored, held that Mr. Marbury had a right to the commissions23
and that he was entitled to a legal remedy;"4 and although Con-
gress expressly granted to the Court the power to issue a writ of
mandamus, the Court held that the Constitution of the United
States did not confer such power upon the Court.2 The Marbury
decision established the court's power of judicial review and
thereby clearly fixed the independence of the judiciary. Marbury
also established the court's implied or inherent power to interpret
with the power of another branch. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), construed in Girardeau v. State, 403 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
17. The framers considered the power of judicial review a critical check on the legisla-
ture. But it is still debated whether the framers intended that the Supreme Court possess
the power to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. Compare C. BEARD, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1962) (concluding that the framers of the Constitu-
tion did not intend to give the Supreme Court the power of judicial review) with Sharp,
supra note 4, at 425, 430 (asserting that all those present at the constitutional convention
who referred to the question, including John Marshall, recognized and approved the doc-
trine of judicial review).
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
19. The separation of powers clash manifested an underlying political struggle between
the new president, Thomas Jefferson, and the Federalists.
20. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 151.
21. Id. at 155.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 162.
24. Id. at 168.
25. Id. at 176.
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the Constitution, even though the Constitution did not expressly
grant such power to the judiciary. Marburyfounded the rule that
"an act of the legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void. ' '2 6
In Florida, as in the federal judiciary, the power of judicial
review or of constitutional interpretation developed as a compel-
ling feature of the court's power to confront encroachments of
other departments of government.27
3. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE IN FLORIDA
The separation of powers doctrine is as much a fundamental
principle of government in Florida as it is in the federal system. 8
The Florida Constitution, which is a limitation of power as op-
posed to a grant of power, 29 divides the government into three sep-
arate branches: the legislative,. the executive, and the judicial. It
also states that no person belonging to one branch may exercise
any powers belonging to another branch unless the constitution ex-
pressly provides for it."0 A fundamental principle of constitutional
law is that each branch of government has, without any express
grant, the "inherent right" to accomplish all objects naturally
within its orbit.3' Each branch, however, must be cautious not to
encroach upon the power of another.32 It is the duty of the judicial
26. Id. at 177. Contra BARD, supra note 17 (refuting the proposition that the framers
intended to grant such power to the Supreme Court).
27. In City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 150 (Fla. 1954), the court relied
on Marbury v. Madison to conclude that courts have the inherent power to declare a zoning
ordinance unconstitutional. See also Girardeau v. State, 403 So. 2d 513, 516 n.4 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1981) ("it is the province and duty of the judicial branch to 'say what the law is' ")
(quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974)); Amos v. Mathews, 99 Fla. 1, 126
So. 308 (1930) (implied provisions of law are as effective as express ones when they are
judicially declared to exist); Getzen v. Sumter County, 89 Fla. 45, 103 So. 104 (1925) (consti-
tution vests power in courts to interpret its provisions and determine whether other state
laws are in accord with the constitution); State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, 102 So.
739 (1924) (function of the judiciary alone to interpret the law).
28. See Otto v. Harllee, 119 Fla. 266, 161 So. 402 (1935); Ponder v. Graham, 4 Fla. 23
(1851); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
29. State ex rel. Kennedy v. Lee, 274 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1973).
30. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
31. Peters v. Meeks, 163 So. 2d 753, 755 (Fla. 1964) (quoting Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961)).
32. See White v. Johnson, 59 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1952) (en banc.). The supreme court
observed the following in Pepper v. Pepper, 66 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1953):
[The courts] have been firm in preventing the encroachment by the Executive
Department upon the Legislative or Judicial Departments of the Government,
[sic) The Courts should be just as diligent, indeed, more so, to safeguard the
powers vested in the Legislature from encroachment by the Judicial branch of
the Government.
[Vol. 39:257
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branch, more than any other, to maintain the separation of three
branches of government.33 Yet, it is difficult to delineate a com-
plete separation of power because there inevitably is some overlap
of function between the branches of government."' Therefore, each
branch of government has a responsibility to "cooperate" with the
other branches to effectuate each 'of their respective constitutional
functions.3"
III. THE SCOPE OF INHERENT POWERS IN THE FLORIDA COURTS
The Florida courts, in addition to powers expressly conferred
by law, "have certain inherent or implied powers." 36 In other
words, the express grants of power conferred upon the judiciary
carry with them the inherent powers to facilitate the exercise of
such express grants.87 A court's inherent powers arise from its exis-
tence as a court, 8 while its express powers depend upon- constitu-
tional or statutory authorization for their exercise. 9 All courts in
Florida possess the inherent powers to do all things that are rea-
sonable and necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of their jurisdiction, subject to valid existing laws and consti-
tutional provisions." Such powers should be exercised with sound
Id. at 284.
33. Pepper, 66 So. 2d at 284.
34. See State Dep't of Health and Rehab. Serv. v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947, 948 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983) (citing 10 FLA. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 139 (1979)); State v. Johnson, 345
So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1977).
35. Forbes v. Earle, 298 So. 2d 1, 5 (Fla. 1974).
36. In re Florida Bar, 61 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1952); State ex rel. Ross v. Call, 39 Fla.
504, 507, 22 So. 748, 749 (1897). When Florida courts discuss the inherent powers doctrine,
they frequently use different terminology to describe that doctrine. See, e.g., Ray v. Wil-
liams, 55 Fla. 723, 724, 46 So. 158, 159 (1908) ("[tlhere is inherent in courts of justice im-
plied power"); Call, 39 Fla. at 507-08, 22 So. at 749 ("[tlhe circuit courts ... have implied
authority"); In re Associate Justice Pearson, 8 Fla. 496, 503 (1859) ("the inherent functions
of the [judicial] department"); Ford Motor.Credit Co. v. Simmons, 421 So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla.
2d DCA 1982) ("[e]very court of law possesses inherent equitable power").
37. See Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 742 (Fla. 1961) ("each de-
partment of government . . . 'has, without any express grant, the inherent right to accom-
plish all objects naturally within the orbit of that department . . . .' ") (citations omitted);
Girardeau v. State, 403 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); State ex rel. Gore Newspaper
Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777, 781 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) ("[tlhis power exists apart from any
statute or specific constitutional provision and springs from the creation of the very court
itself. . ").
38. See, e.g., In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902, 905 (Fla. 1949).
39. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Collazo, 329 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
40. See, e.g., Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978) (citing 8 FLA. JUR.
COURTS § 74 (1956)); State ex rel. Davis v. City of Avon Park, 117 Fla. 565, 158 So. 159
(1934); Keen v. State, 89 Fla. 113, 103 So. 399 (1925); State v. Gleason, 12 Fla. 190 (1869). In
Rose v. Palm Beach County, the court stated that:
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judicial discretion."
In Rose v. Palm Beach County,4 the court noted that the in-
vocation of the doctrine of inherent powers appears most compel-
ling when the judicial function at issue involves the safeguarding of
fundamental human rights.'3 The Rose court cited Carlson v. State
ex rel. Stodola," which stated that a court's freedom of action is
necessary to protect "[tihe security of human rights and the safety
of free institutions." "5 However, "a court is not free if it is under
financial pressure."" Therefore, the courts must have the power to
compel the funds necessary to secure their independence.
A. Separation of Powers Confrontations-The Judiciary's Use
of Inherent Powers to Protect Itself as an Independent Branch
of Government
1. THE POWER TO COMPEL FUNDS
There are various considerations involved in utilizing the. doc-
trine of inherent powers to compel an appropriation or expenditure
of funds for judicial purposes.4' No court in this country has de-
nied its inherent power to compel the payment of funds.4' The ba-
sic issue involves, therefore, the extent of the power rather than its
existence."
The doctrine of inherent judicial power provides courts with a
method of responding to the actions of the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government that threaten a court's ability to func-
"Inherent powers" of courts have been described as "all powers reasonably re-
quired to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its
dignity, independence and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective.
These powers are inherent in the sense they exist because the court exists
361 So. 2d at 136 n.3 (quoting CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THr COuRTS 2 (1973)); see
also Cratsley, Inherent Powers of the Courts (1980) (available from the National Judicial
College, American Bar Association at University of Nevada, Reno).
41. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d at 905.
42. Rose, 361 So. 2d 135.
43. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21, which states: "[t]he courts shall be open to every person
for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
44. 247 Ind. 631, 220 N.E.2d 532 (1966).
45. Id. at 633, 220 N.E.2d at 533.
46. Id., 220 N.E.2d at 533-34.
47. See generally Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3d 569 (1974) (circumstances under which a court
may in the absence of statutory authority compel a governmental entity to appropriate or
expropriate funds for "proper" judicial purposes).
48. Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 975,
979 (1972).
49. Id.
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tion.50 The doctrine exists because it is essential to the survival of
the courts as an independent branch of government."
Case law suggests that a court possesses the inherent power to
"compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable
and necessary to carry out its mandated responsibilities."'52 Unless
the judiciary can compel the legislative branch of government to
provide the funds that are necessary for the proper functioning of
the court, the judicial system could be seriously impaired or
destroyed.
By virtue of constitutional authority and in accordance with
the separation of powers doctrine and the concept of balance of
power, budgeting authority rests largely with the legislative branch
of government. One commentator, Professor James Brennan, con-
tends that a court's exercise of judicial fiscal independence violates
the doctrine of separation of powers.53 Brennan argues that deci-
sions advocating judicial fiscal independence, based on the separa-
tion of powers theory, "ignore the coordinate principle of checks
and balances."5 ' He claims that "the judiciary has almost univer-
sally accepted the power of the legislature to review and alter its
judicial budget."5' Another writer, however, concludes that judicial
fiscal independence is not violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers; instead, it is necessary for the preservation of such
doctrine."0
Chief Justice Marshall stated in McCulloch v. Maryland,'7
"[t]hat the power to tax involves the power to destroy." 8 As set
forth in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate:"
A Legislature has the power of life and death over all the Courts
and over the entire Judicial system. Unless the Legislature can
be compelled by the Courts to provide the money which is rea-
sonably necessary for the proper functioning and administration
of the Courts, our entire Judicial system could be extirpated,
and the Legislature could make a mockery of our form of Gov-
50. See Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978).
51. See id. at 137 n.6 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 52,
274 A.2d 193, 197 (1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971)).
52. Carroll, 442 Pa. 45, 52, 274 A.2d 193, 197, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971).
53. See Brennan, Judicial Fiscal Independence, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 277 (1971).
54. Id. at 288.
55. Id.
56. See Note, supra note 48, at 987.
57. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
58. Id. at 431.
59. 442 Pa. at 57, 274 A.2d at 199.
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ernment ....
Courts, in the states that have considered the question of a
court's inherent power to compel funds, have generally upheld
their inherent authority to compel payment of expenses "necessa-
rily incurred" in the discharge of their duties." Such courts have
generally taken the view that neither statutes nor administrative
action can defeat the ultimate use of the court's inherent power to
compel payment of "reasonably necessary" expenses.61
Although there are only a few cases where the Florida judici-
ary has exercised its inherent power to compel an appropriation or
expenditure of funds6 2 for important court purposes, the doctrine
remains viable. Perhaps one may infer from the poverty of case law
on this subject the state government's recognition of and respect
for the judiciary's inherent power to compel the expenditure or ap-
propriation of funds." The doctrine's ultimate strength rests not
in its use, but in the knowledge that the doctrine exists and that
the judiciary may invoke it when necessary to protect itself as an
independent branch of government."'
The doctrine may be invoked in appropriate cases where an-
other department of government fails to provide the funds that are
reasonably necessary for the judiciary to perform its essential func-
tions.6 Thus, a court's inherent powers should be utilized only
when the court has exhausted the established methods and statu-
tory procedures for fulfilling its needs. 6 As long as the judiciary
maintains its credibility with the other departments of government
by not making excessive or unreasonable demands, it should be
able to obtain the funds needed to carry out its mandated respon-
sibilities through cooperation, negotiation, and compromise. Courts
should strive for cooperation, not confrontation. The judicial ham-
mer of inherent powers should be used only when judicial indepen-
dence or the capacity to perform an essential judicial function is
threatened.67
60. See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3d 569, 595-96 (1974).
61. Id.; see Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (1981).
62. E.g., Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
63. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1981); Broward
County v. Wright, 420 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
64. See Alpert & Masterson, The Judicial Power: Is Florida Covering its Bets?, 8 SMTr-
SON L. REv. 265, 273 (1979) ("Historically, a distinctive feature of judicial power ... is that
it remains at rest until it is properly invoked.").
65. See Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. 1978).
66. See Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3d 569, 586 (1974).
67. See Rose, 361 So. 2d at 139; see also Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa.
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a. Awarding Witness Fees and Travel Expenses in Excess of
Statutory Limitations
In the case of Rose v. Palm Beach County,68 the Supreme
Court of Florida held that a trial court has the inherent power to
require a county to pay witness fees and expenses that exceed stat-
utory limitations. 9 The Rose court held that the exercise of its in-
herent power to require an expenditure of public funds in excess of
statutory limitations was necessary to insure a fair trial, to safe-
guard the fundamental rights of a defendant, and to enable the
court to perform an essential judicial function."'
The court applied the "reasonable and necessary" standard to
compel funds from the legislature:
Every court has inherent power to do all things that are rea-
sonably necessary for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction, subject to valid existing laws and con-
stitutional provisions. The doctrine of inherent judicial power
as it relates to the practice of compelling the expenditure of
funds by the executive and legislative branches of government
has developed as a way of responding to inaction or inadequate
action that amounts to a threat to the courts' ability to make
effective their jurisdiction. The doctrine exists because it is cru-
cial to the survival of the judiciary as an independent, function-
ing and co-equal branch of government. The invocation of the
doctrine is most compelling when the judicial function at issue is
the safeguarding of fundamental rights.7 1
The court announced that the doctrine of inherent powers should
be invoked only in situations of "clear necessity," after established
45, 53, 274 A.2d 193, 197, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971) (stating that "if this cooperation
breaks down, the Judiciary must exercise its inherent power to preserve the efficient and
expeditious administration of Justice and protect it from being destroyed.") (citations
omitted).
68. 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978).
69. This was done where, because of a change of venue in a criminal prosecution, more
than 75 witnesses, many of whom were indigent, were required to travel a distance of some
300 miles. Id. at 136.
70. Id. at 139.
71. Id. at 137 .(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); accord Commonwealth ex rel. Car-
roll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 57, 274 A.2d 193, 199. Tate also applied the "reasonable and neces-
sary" standard in compelling public expenditures. One commentator acknowledges it as one
of the most important decisions in the field. See Stern, The Judiciary is Failing to Protect
the Courts, 18 JUDGES J. 16, 20 (1979) (unconstitutional impairment of judiciary's perform-
ance of its functions results from lack of judges, personnel, physical facilities, and reasona-
ble operating budgets); see also Beckert v. Warren, 497 Pa. 137, 439 A.2d 638 (1981).
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methods have failed and where an emergency exists.7 The trial
court, in such instances, has the burden of showing that such ac-
tion is necessary to enable it to perform an "essential" judicial
function. Courts must maintain their neutrality; they should not
invade the areas of responsibility of the other branches of govern-
ment.7  The supreme court cautioned that trial courts must be
careful in seeking solutions to practical administrative problems
that the legislature has not resolved 75 -and must "refrain from
[making] any extravagant, arbitrary, or unwarranted expendi-
tures. ' '71 Moreover, in examining whether the statutory language
established a mandatory maximum for witness fees in all cases, the
court found that the statute was merely directory of a matter
within the court's inherent power.77
b. Awards of Attorney Fees
Despite the holding of Rose v. Palm Beach County, Florida
appellate courts have continued to strictly construe attorney fees
limitations that the legislature established as mandatory and not
directory. This has occurred even when the trial court found that
the statutory limitation was unreasonable or infringed upon inher-
ent judicial power.7
72. Rose, 361 So. 2d at 138 n.9 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 139.
74. Id. at 138.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 138 n.9 (quoting McAfee v. State ex rel. Stodola, 258 Ind. 667, 681, 284
N.E.2d 778, 782 (1972))..
77. Id. at 139 n.14 (quoting CARRIGAN, INHERENT POWERS OF THE CouRTs 8 (1973)).
78. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dade County v. Bridges, 402 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1981). In
Bridges, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the limits set in section 925.036 of the
Florida Statutes (1983) were mandatory, not directory. See also County of Seminole v.
Wadell, 382 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (section 925.036(4) of the Florida Statutes
(1983) limiting maximum fee that court can award to attorney in a capital case to $2500 is
mandatory not directory in nature); Broward County v. Wright, 420 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1982) (construing fee limitation statute strictly, but intimates exception is possible if
extreme circumstances are demonstrated); Marion County v. De Boisblanc, 410 So. 2d 951
(Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (trial court without authority to award amount in excess of statutory
maximum); cf. MacKenzie v. Hillsborough County, 288 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1973) (section
925.035 of the Florida Statutes (1981) limiting reasonable compensation for representation
of indigent in capital case is constitutional); Dade County v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183 (Fla.
3d DCA 1980) (even though trial court had authority to appoint two private attorneys to
represent insolvent criminal defendant, it did not have statutory or inherent authority to
compensate more than one).
In Bridges, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that the lower court erred in awarding
attorney's fees higher than those specified in the statute, even though the lower court deter-
mined that special circumstances existed. 402 So. 2d 411, 414-15 (Fla. 1981). Chief Justice
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c. Courthouse Space
The Florida Statutes require counties to provide appropriate
courtrooms and facilities for the courts.79 Nevertheless, the su-
preme court recently considered a dispute arising over courthouse
space between a Chief Judge and a county commission in Chief
Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Board of County Commis-
sioners.80 In Board of County Commissioners, the commission
adopted a resolution reassigning space that the courts were using
to other users of the county courthouse."1 Without holding an evi-
dentiary hearing, the Chief Judge issued an injunction restraining
the county commission from interfering with the court's space
without court approval."
The supreme court affirmed the district court's holding that
the county was entitled to an evidentiary hearing before a judicial
officer from outside the circuit." The court noted that inherent
power could not be exercised except to acquire "necessary" as op-
posed to "desirable" space." The cause was thus remanded. 5 The
Sundberg, concurring specially, conceded to the authority of the legislature, in its role of
protector of the public treasury, to set reasonable limits on amounts paid to attorneys in
such cases. Id. at 415. However, Justice Boyd, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
cited Rose v. Palm Beach County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978), for the proposition that the
court has the power to order compensation in excess of statutory amounts. Id. at 416. Jus-
tice Overton, dissenting, declared that he would find the statute directory and not
mandatory. Id. at 417 (Overton, J., dissenting).
79. FLA. STAT. § 43.28 (1983). In Florida, the funding of the judiciary is substantially
provided from county revenues. The State's major contribution to the judiciary is in the
form of salaries for judges and judicial assistance. The funding of Florida's judiciary is an
interdependent and largely decentralized system of local funding. The counties, rather than
the state, have been better able to bear the burden of funding the courts. Also, filing fees
fund Florida's trial courts. See, e.g., Sec. 11-3, Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Fla. The
argument, supporting such a fee system is that those who use the system pay for it. It may
be argued that state funding of the judiciary could threaten trial court autonomy and flexi-
bility in responding to local judicial needs. For arguments supporting state unitary budget-
ing, see, e.g., Judicial Power-The Inherent Power of the Courts To Compel Funding for
Their Own Needs, 53 WASH. L. REv. 331, 346-48 (1978).
80. 401 So. 2d 1330 (Fla. 1981).
81. Id. at 1331.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1332.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citations omitted); see FLA. STAT. § 125.221 (1983). Section 125.221 provides
that:
In the event there is not suitable available space in the courthouse due to con-
struction or reconstruction, destruction or other good reasons, for the holding of
any court or courts now provided to be held in the county courthouse, or for the
meeting of the grand jury of the county, the county commission, with the ap-
proval of the court, may designate some other place or places located in the
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court declared that "[g]enerally, court claims to courthouse space
necessary to the performance of official court functions are para-
mount.""6 The judiciary, as a co-equal branch of government, has
the inherent power to protect itself in the performance of assigned
duties and functions.8 7 The county bears the burden of proving9 a
lack of "reasonable necessity" for continued court use of existing
space because the county is trying to reduce the courts' use of such
space. If the court were seeking additional space or the renovation
of existing space, it would bear the burden of showing a "reasona-
ble necessity" for such space.""
d. Court Facilities
As mentioned earlier, Florida law requires counties to provide
"appropriate" courtrooms and facilities.9 0 The few cases in which
the judiciary sought a new courthouse under the inherent powers
doctrine were settled before trial."1 There is no court decision
clearly examining this situation under an inherent powers
analysis.e2
e. Court Personnel
No Florida court has ever compelled the employment of addi-
tional personnel or payment of increased salaries for court person-
nel. Florida law, however, requires counties to provide for neces-
sary personnel." As stated in Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v.
county seat for the holding of court or courts or for the meeting of the grand
jury.
The county also is charged with the responsibility to provide and maintain county buildings
under section 125.01(c) of the Florida Statutes (1983). Furthermore, article V, section 7 of
the Florida Constitution provides that a circuit or county court may hold trials and hearings
anywhere within the territorial jurisdiction of the court as designated by the chief judge of
the circuit.
86. See Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v. Board of County Comm'rs, 401 So.
2d 1330, 1332 (Fla. 1981).
87. Id. (citations omitted).
88. As to burden of proof, the court followed its decision in Rose v. Palm Beach
County, 361 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978); see also Chief Judge of the Eighth Judicial Circuit v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 401 So. 2d at 1332.
89. 401 So. 2d at 1332 (citation omitted).
90.. FLA. STAT. § 43.28 (1983).
91. See Cratsley, supra note 40, at 52.
92. Id.
93. FLA. STAT. § 43.28 (1983). See accompanying text in note 79. For a historical analy-
sis of inherent judicial power to prescribe court employee salaries, see In re Salary of Juve-
nile Director, 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976); see also Annot., 59 A.L.R. 3d 569, 595-
96 (1974) (discussion of inherent judicial power to compel appropriation of funds for judicial
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Tate:"4
Should the legislature, or the county salary board, act arbitrarily
or capriciously and fail or neglect to provide a sufficient number
of court employes [sic] or for the payment of adequate salaries
to them, whereby the efficient administration of justice is im-
paired or destroyed, the Court possesses inherent power to sup-
ply the deficiency. 5
2. THE POWER OVER THE FLORIDA BAR-
In a case involving the issue of the regulation of attorney ad-
mission to the bar and disbarment," the Supreme Court of Florida
noted in dictum that "apart from any statutory law, a court of rec-
ord has the inherent power to provide the necessary assistance as a
means of conducting its business. ' 97 Regulation of the bar, how-
ever, is an area of the law that gives rise to confrontations between
the legislature and the courts regarding the issue of separation of
powers.e8 In the early nineteenth century, the Florida Legislature
began regulating admission to the bar and the disbarment of attor-
neys for unprofessional conduct.9 For more than a century, Flor-
ida courts acquiesced in such legislative control.100 In 1938, how-
ever, the supreme court unequivocally voiced its view that the
power to regulate the bar "is inherent in the courts and cannot be
purposes).
94. 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971); accord Beckert v. War-
ren, 497 Pa. 137,. 146, 439 A.2d 638, 643 (1981).
95. 442 Pa. at 55, 274 A.2d at 198.
96. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
97. Id. at 907.
98. In one such confrontation, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the Public
Records Law, which provides for public inspection of "public records," did not apply to the
unauthorized practice of law investigative files maintained by the Florida Bar. In re Florida
Bar, 398 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1981). In the court's view, the Public Records Law represented the
legislature's attempt to exercise power over a matter explicitly vested in the court under
article V of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 447. The court stated that "[t]he unauthorized
practice of law investigative files of the Florida Bar, as an official arm of this Court, are
subject to the control and direction of this Court and not to either of the other branches of
the government." Id. at 448. In another such confrontation, the court held unconstitutional
an act of the legislature that required lawyers representing criminal defendants to move the
court to assess attorney's fees and costs against the defendant. Graham v. Murrell, 9 FLA. L.
WEEKLY 2646 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984). However, in the field of sovereign immunity, a legisla-
tive cap on the amount of recoverable attorney's fees was upheld as constitutional, such did
"not amount to a legislature usurpation of the power of the judiciary to regulate the practice
of law." Ingraham v. Dade School Board, 450 So. 2d 847, 849 (Fla. 1984).
99. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 134 Fla. 851, 864-65, 186 So. 280, 285-86 (1938) (giv-
ing an interesting and detailed account of the early legislative control of the bar in Florida).
100. Id.
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taken from them by the Legislature. '" 10 1
The supreme court presently retains exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate admissions to the bar. Its exclusive jurisdiction is predi-
cated on its inherent judicial power as well as its constitutional
authority under article V, section 15, of the Florida Constitution.10 2
a. Power to Supervise the Bar and to Discipline Attorneys
Judicial power "to discipline attorneys at law is as ancient as
the common law itself."10 Although the Supreme Court of Florida
has always had inherent disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys,",
an express provision of the Florida Constitution governs such
jurisdiction.105
In addition to its power to discipline attorneys, the Supreme
Court of Florida retains supervisory power over the bar in gen-
eral.106 This inherent right to supervise the bar is incident to the
court's power to control, admit to practice, and discipline
attorneys.10 7
101. Id. at 862, 186 So. at 285 (citations omitted). The court acknowledged that the
early English common law rule was that "admission to the bar was deemed a legislative
function but that it was under the act of 4 Hen. IV, chapter 18, made a judicial function
which it continued to be and was so when the common law of England was adopted by
statute in (Florida]." Id. at 863, 186 So. at 285; see also FLA. CONST. art. V, § 15 ("supreme
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the admission of persons to the practice of
law and the discipline of persons admitted").
102. See In re Florida Bar, 398 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1981) (quoting In re Florida Bd. of
Bar Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98, 100 (Fla. 1977)).
103. Florida Bar v. Massfeller, 170 So. 2d 834, 838 (Fla. 1964); In re Florida Bar, 316
So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975).
104. E.g., In re Jacksonville Bar Ass'n, 125 Fla. 175, 177-78, 169 So. 674, 675 (1936);
Gould v. State, 99 Fla. 662, 664, 127 So. 309, 310 (1930); Florida Bar v. Massfeller, 170 So.
2d 834, 838 (Fla. 1964).
105. FLA. CONsT. art. V, § 15. This express constitutional provision is said to be a recog-
nition of the preexisting authority of the Florida courts. Massfeller, 170 So. 2d at 838. There
are several methods available to a court for disciplining attorneys. One such method is the
imposition of contempt sanctions upon attorneys who commit minor infractions. Burns v.
Huffstetler, 433 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 1983). Another method available to the court is the
traditional grievance committee-referee process wherein the Bar prosecutes the attorney and
the court imposes sanctions based on the referee's recommendations. Id. Finally, a proce-
dure exists whereby the state attorney initiates prosecution of delinquent attorneys and the
Supreme Court of Florida may review the trial court's decision. Id.
106. Burns v. Huflstetler, 433 So. 2d 964, 965 (Fla. 1983).
107. In re Florida Bar, 398 So. 2d 446, 447-48 (Fla. 1981) (reaffirming In re Florida Bar,
316 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1975)); see also In re Florida Board of Examiners, 353 So. 2d 98 (Fla.
1977) (The Florida Board of Bar Examiners is answerable solely to the judiciary.)
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b. Power to Integrate the Bar and Power to Impose a
Membership Fee
In 1948, the Florida State Bar Association sought a ruling by
the Supreme Court of Florida to integrate the Florida Bar.108 The
court took the opportunity to reexamine the underpinnings of the
inherent powers doctrine.10 9 Acknowledging its inherent power to
control the administration of justice within the judicial branch of
the government, °10 the court concluded that it possessed the inher-
ent right to integrate the bar by rule."' After deciding that it had
the inherent power to integrate the bar, the court considered
whether it had the authority to impose a membership fee for the
support of bar integration activities.' If such a fee could be con-
strued as a tax, "undoubtedly it should be imposed by the legisla-
ture under its police power." ' s The court, in distinguishing a
membership fee from a tax, stated that a membership fee in a bar
association is "an exaction for regulation only," 4 whereas the pur-
pose of a tax is to obtain revenue." 5 In the court's view, the power
to regulate carried with it the implied power to impose a charge for
that purpose." 6 In sum, "[a]ttorneys . . . are officers of the Court
and as such constitute an important part of the judicial system
108. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1949).
109. The court stated that:
Inherent power arises from the fact of the Court's creation or from the fact that
it is a court. It is essential to its being and dignity and does not require an
express grant to confer it. Under our form of government it is the right that each
department of government has to execute the powers falling naturally within its
orbit ....
Id. at 905; see also Florida Bar v. Lewis, 358 So. 2d 897, 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff'd, 372
So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1979) (noting that the preamble to the integration Rule of the Florida Bar
that the supreme court adopted acknowledges the court's inherent power over the Florida
Bar).
110. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d at 905.
111. Id. at 906.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 906. The court noted that "[w]hile the police power is generally considered
an exclusive power of the legislature, it may . . . be exercised by the Courts." Id. (citing
Workmen's Compensation Bd. v. Abbott, 212 Ky. 123, 278 S.W. 533 (1949)).
114. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d at 906.
115. Id. The court clarified the distinction between a fee and a tax in its earlier decision
in City of Jacksonville v. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163, 201-04, 7 So. 885, 891-92 (1890).
116. The court noted that "[i]f the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the bar, it
follows that as an incident to regulation it may impose a membership fee for that purpose..
. [T]he doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such an
exaction." In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d at 906-07; cf. Florida Bar v. Lewis, 358
So. 2d 897, 899 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), aff'd, 372 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1979) (as part of the judici-
ary, the Florida Bar was immune from taxation by the legislature).
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. ... [T]he right to define and regulate the practice [of law] natu-
rally and logically belongs to the judicial department of
government."' 1 7
B. The Inherent Power of the Court to Regulate Practice and
Procedure
Although the supreme court has used the inherent powers doc-
trine to justify its rulemaking authority (or its control of its prac-
tice and procedure),"' this does not mean that the judiciary has
always exercised exclusive control over rulemaking. Historically,
the Florida Legislature has either enjoyed supremacy, or has
shared rulemaking authority with the judicial department." 9 As a
result, there evolved a gray area of overlapping or coordinate au-
thority in rulemaking between the legislature and the judiciary.12 0
1. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURT'S RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY
The Florida Supreme Court has long recognized its inherent
power to prescribe such rules of practice and procedure as it
deemed necessary to facilitate the administration of justice."1' In
Humphries v. Hester & Stinson Lumber Co.,"'2 it stated that "this
Court has always been clothed with inherent power to make rules
for its governance. "12
117. In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 40 So. 2d at 907.
118. See In re Florida Bar, 61 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 1952).
119. See State ex rel. Ross v. Call, 39 Fla. 504, 22 So. 748 (1897). Section 12 of the Act
of December 13, 1824, granted the courts of appeals the power to make all rules necessary
for the regulation of the courts. Id. at 511, 22 So. at 750. Such rules were to be submitted to
the legislature and, if approved by the legislative council, would have the authority of law.
Id.
120. See In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1940); Note, The
Rulemaking Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone Between Substance
and Procedure, 24 U. FLA. L REV. 87, 87 (1971).
121. See In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 145 Fla. 223, 226, 199 So. 57, 58 (1940); In re
Jacksonville Bar Ass'n, 125 Fla. 175, 177, 169 So. 674, 675 (1936); In re Associate Justice
Pearson, 8 Fla. 496 (1859).
122. 103 Fla. 1081, 141 So. 749 (1932).
123. Id. at 1082, 141 So. at 749. To the contrary, one commentator remarked:
Prior to the "Great Debate" over procedural reform in the 1920's and 1930's, the
scope of judicial rulemaking was generally limited to administrative matters
such as contempt, administration of the bar, and regulation of court business.
Such matters were considered within the inherent power of the courts by virtue
of the constitutional separation of powers.
Note, supra note 120, at 88-89 (footnotes omitted). Later, however, in Bluesten v. Florida
Real Estate Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1960), by virtue of a constitutional amendment
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Notwithstanding the inherent powers and separation of pow-
ers doctrines, the supreme court, from the beginning of this state's
history, acquiesced in legislative control of rulemaking. 14 Although
the court recognized that it had the "inherent power" or "implied
authority" to "adopt necessary rules" to enable it to exercise its
jurisdiction, the court accepted legislative supremacy over
rulemaking, except where the legislature failed to provide a neces-
sary method of procedure, or where a legislative enactment sub-
stantially impaired the court's constitutional powers.125 "[T]he
scope of judicial rulemaking was generally limited to administra-
tive matters such as contempt, administration of the bar and regu-
lation of court business.I''  Although it recognized that the Florida
judiciary had the inherent power to prescribe rules of procedure
and rules to facilitate the administration of justice as "deemed
necessary,"'27 the court's power was subject to the limitation that
such rules must be "subordinate to law and in cases of conflict the
law [should] prevail.' 28
2. THE COURT'S RULEMAKING AUTHORITY TODAY
A revision in 1956 of article V of the Florida Constitution pro-
vided that "[t]he practice and procedure in all courts shall be gov-
that was adopted in 1956, the Supreme Court of Florida held that "the sole power to pre-
scribe rules for the practice and procedure in the courts is vested by the Constitution in this
Court." Id. at 568.
124. See, e.g., Keen v. State, 89 Fla. 113, 103 So. 399 (1925). For an interesting history
of the court's rulemaking power, see Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure
in Florida Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 442 (1980). In an early line of cases, the court deter-
mined that the Florida Legislature could lawfully prescribe rules of procedure that the
courts would observe. See State ex rel. Ross v. Call, 39 Fla. 504, 507, 22 So. 748, 749 (1897);
Note, supra 120, at 88-89. Yet, the court has also held that "[t]he legislature has no power
to prescribe rules regulating the conduct of the court's business or other matters within the
inherent power of the court to regulate." Sydney v. Auburndale Constr. 'Corp., 96 Fla. 688,
691, 119 So. 128, 129 (1928) (citations omitted). But see Ruff v. Ga. S. & Fla. Ry. Co., 67
Fla. 224, 233, 64 So. 782, 785 (1914).
125. Smith v. Guckenheimer, 42 Fla. 1, 23-26, 27 So. 900, 907 (1900) (opinion of Carter,
J.); see Keen v. State, 89 Fla. 113, 103 So. 399 (1925).
126. Note supra note 120, at 88-89.
127. In re Jacksonville Bar Ass'n, 125 Fla. 175, 177, 169 So. 674, 675 (1936). In Hum-
phries v. Hester & Stinson Lumber Co., 103 Fla. 1081, 141 So. 749 (1932), the court stated
that the Florida Supreme Court "has always been clothed with inherent power to make
rules for its goverenance." Id. at 1082, 141 So. at 749.
128. In re Jacksonville Bar Ass'n, 169 So. at 675; e.g., State ex rel. Fisher v. Rowe, 110
Fla. 141, 144, 148 So. 588, 589 (1933); Keen v. State, 89 Fla. 113, 115, 103 So. 399, 400
(1925). See generally In re Florida State Bar Ass'n, 145 Fla. 223, 228, 199 So. 57, 59 (1940);
Note, supra note 120, at 88-90 (discussing the history of reforms in the area of judicial
rulemaking).
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erned by rules adopted by the supreme court."' 29 As a result of this
constitutional revision, the supreme court held that it had the
"sole power" to prescribe rules of practice and procedure in the
Florida courts.8 0 Since then, the judiciary has considered any at-
tempt by the legislature to create rules of practice and procedure
to be an encroachment of its power, as an independent branch of
government, "' in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.13 '
The exclusiveness of the supreme court's authority over
rulemaking "constitutes one dimension of the new rulemaking au-
thority." 8 The "other dimension" consists of a distinction be-
tween substance and procedure under the separation of powers
doctrine.' "
While substantive law is said to create and define legal rights
with respect to persons and their property, practice and procedure
may be described as the "legal machinery by which substantive law
is made effective." 3 Nevertheless, such distinctions are not always
easily made. The entire area of substance and procedure has been
described as a "twilight zone" 86 in which it is sometimes difficult
129. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (1957, amended 1972); see Bluesten v. Florida Real Estate
Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1960) (holding that the 1956 constitutional amendment
vested exclusive rulemaking authority in the supreme court). But see Means, supra note
124, at 447 (contending that "[a]lthough the new [1956] provision could certainly be read as
vesting exclusive authority, the Florida supreme court never so applied it"). In State v.
Furen, 118 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1960), the supreme court noted that "[iut seems to make little
difference whether the provisions of section 3 were merely declaratory of a power already
vested in the Supreme Court or were a grant of a power not inherent in the court." Id. at 11.
However, the Florida Constitution, as amended in 1972, recognized legislative supremacy in
the area of rulemaking by stating that the Florida Supreme Court "shall adopt rules for the
practice and procedure in all courts," but that "[these rules may be repealed by general law
enacted by two-thirds vote" of the legislature. FLA. CoNsT. art. V, § 2(a).
130. Bluesten v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 125 So. 2d 567, 568 (Fla. 1960); see, e.g.,
Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003, 1005 n.8 (Fla. 1978); In re Clarification of Fla. Rules,
281 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 1973) (modifying In re Amendments to Rule 3.125(j), 297 So. 2d 301
(Fla. 1974)); Vic Potamkin Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bloom, 386 So. 2d 286, 287 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
131. E.g., Johnson v. State, 308 So. 2d 127, 128 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
132. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005 n.8 (citing FLA. CONsT. art. II, § 3, which provides that
the legislative branch may not exercise powers pertaining to the judicial branch).
133. Means, supra note 124, at 452.
134. Id. at 452-53. Means argued that the creation of such a boundary was inappropri-
ate because of the "inherent imprecision" in the distinction between substance and proce-
dure, and because of the nature of the powers being separated. Id. at 468.
135. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d 236, 238 (Fla. 1969); e.g., In re Florida Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 66 (Fla. 1972); Military Park v. DeMarois, 407 So. 2d 1020,
1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Procedural law is also referred to as "adjective law" or the "law
of remedy." Garcia, 229 So. 2d at 238. It is the "means and methods to apply and enforce"
substantive rights. State v. ex rel. J. A., Jr., 367 So. 2d 702, 703 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
136. E.g., In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d at 66 (Adkins, J.,
concurring).
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to distinguish whether a particular matter involves substance or
procedure. 3 7 Because a substantive right must be implemented
procedurally, distinguishing between what is substantive and what
is procedural is no easy task." 8 As a result, confusion sometimes
occurs in determining authority over rulemaking, and has resulted
in conflict between the judiciary and the legislature. A statute or
rule is characterized as substantive or procedural depending on
"the nature of the problem for which a characterization must be
made." 39
Unless an enactment of the legislature is substantive rather
than procedural, the legislature has exceeded its rulemaking au-
thority. The supreme court has adopted a "substantive rights" the-
ory to define the limits of its authority.140 This theory, based on
the separation of powers doctrine, provides that Florida Supreme
Court rules shall not abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive
rights of any litigant.141
137. State v. Garcia, 229 So. 2d at 238.
138. Cf. Cozine v. Tullo, 394 So. 2d 115, 116 (Fla. 1981) (MacDonald, J., dissenting)
(statute prohibiting joinder of liability insurer as a defendant is an unconstitutional invasion
of supreme court's rulemaking authority).
For instance, in Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978), the nature of section
627.7262 of the Florida Statutes (1977), which prohibited joinder of motor vehicle liability
insurers as defendants at the commencement of a lawsuit brought against the insured, but
allowed joinder following a rendition of a verdict with respect to liability, was at issue. The
court held that section 627.7262 involved procedural aspects of trial rather than substantive
rights, and therefore violated its rulemaking authority under the Florida Constitution. Five
years later, however, the supreme court ruled in Van Bibber v. Hartford, 439 So. 2d 880
(Fla. 1983), that virtually the same statute was substantive in nature and therefore constitu-
tional. The Van Bibber court's reasoning, however, is not compelling and suggests that by
couching a statute that is inherently procedural-such as one involving joinder-in substan-
tive language, the legislature is free to invade the court's authority with respect to promul-
gating rules of procedure. In Van Bibber, the court distinguished section 627.7262 of the
Florida Statutes (Supp. 1982), from its predecessor in Markert, section 627.7262 of the Flor-
ida Statutes (1977), on the basis that the former requires, as a condition precedent to having
a third party interest in an insurance policy, the vesting of that interest by judgment,
whereas the latter statute does not. 439 So. 2d at 882-83. Contra FLA. STAT. § 627.7262(4)
(1977), Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d at 1004. The court also distinguished the statutes on
the basis that the 1982 statute specifically authorized a contractual provision in the policy
prohibiting direct third party suits. 439 So. 2d at 883.
139. Adams v. Wright, 403 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. 1981) (quoting In re Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d at 66 (Adkins, J., concurring).
140. Note, supra note 120, at 91; Nash, Florida Appeal Times, 16 U. MIAMI L. Rav. 24,
42 (1961).
141. See State v. Furen, 118 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1960). Furen involved a conflict between
a state statute and a court rule. The statute granted an appeal as a matter of right, while
the court rule provided that such appeals were by certiorari. Finding that the rule limited a
substantive right, the court declared that the rule exceeded the scope of practice and proce-
dure. Id.; cf. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Clay, 133 So. 2d 735, 741 (Fla. 1961) (adoption by
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3. RECENT LEGISLATION NOT INVOLVING SEPARATION OF POWERS
CONFRONTATIONS WITH THE JUDICIARY
In a number of recent acts of the legislature, the supreme
court avoided a substance versus procedure question by adopting
legislative enactments as court rules." 2 The court has acknowl-
edged that it "considers these laws as expressing the intent of the
legislature and has formulated rules of practice and procedure that
attempt to conform with the intent of the Legislature .... ,,143 Ad-
ditionally, where legislative acts are neither clearly substantive nor
procedural, the court has adopted the statutes as a matter of con-
venience to avoid deciding whether a matter lies within the realm
of substantive or procedural law. 4 '
a. Florida Evidence Code
The supreme court avoided a confrontation with the legisla-
ture by adopting the Florida Evidence Code."45 This adoption was
in part due to confusion as to whether a specific evidentiary provi-
sion is substantive or procedural, 14 but may also have been the
result of the supreme court's reluctance to face the legislature in a
separation of powers confrontation. The legislature's Florida Evi-
dence Code was thus adopted as court rules "to the extent that
supreme court of rule authorizing it to determine certified questions from federal courts was
a valid exercise of state supreme court's "organic" power).
142. See infra notes 145, 151, 156 and accompanying text. For an interesting discussion
of the role of the legislature in rulemaking, see Parness, The Legislative Role in Florida's
Judicial Rulemaking, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 359 (1981). Parness proposes a more active role by
the legislature and "implementation of 'public process in judicial rulemaking.'" Id. at 360.
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted Florida Rule of JudiCial Administration 2.125 (effec-
tive March 1, 1985) (In re Amendment to Rules of Judicial Administration, No. 66,593 (Fla.
Sup. Ct. filed Feb. 28, 1985)). The new rule creates a judicial council composed of judges, a
state attorney, a public defender, a clerk of the court, members of the Bar, and members of
the public to study and recommend changes in the operation and procedure of the court to
improve the administration of justice.
143. In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204 (Fla.
1973).
144. Id. at 205.
145. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369, clarified, 376 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 1979)
(clarifying dates of applicability to civil and criminal matters), modified, In re Amendment
of Florida Evidence Code, 404 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1981) (incorporating statutory changes). The
evidence code was enacted in 1976 Fla. Laws, ch. 76-237, amended by 1977 Fla. Laws, chs.
77-77, 77-174, 1978 Fla. Laws, chs. 78-361, 78-379 and codified at Fla. Stat. §§ 90.101-90.958
(1979).
146. In re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d at 1369 (rules of evidence may in some
instances be substantive and in others procedural).
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they are procedural.'14 7
b. Court Administration
Section 43.35 of the Florida Statutes, which requires the court
administrator in each county within the judicial circuit to establish
a witness coordinating office, is another area in which the legisla-
ture has exercised authority and the court has acquiesced to such
controL148 This section imposes upon the courts the administrative
responsibility of contacting and coordinating witness appearances
in criminal cases.14 ' Section 43 also provides for the selection and
powers of a presiding judge for each judicial circuit.8 0 With the
supreme court's adoption of a similar rule, Florida Rule of Judicial
Administration 2.050, the court laid to rest the question of legisla-
tive encroachment.' 1
c. Sentencing Guidelines
Another area where a separation of powers confrontation
could have but did not occur, is sentencing guidelines. The legisla-
ture created a "sentencing commission" to develop a statewide sys-
147. Id.
148. Section 43.35 of the Florida Statutes provides:
Each court administrator shall establish a witness coordinating office in each
county within his judicial circuit. The office shall be responsible for:
(1) Coordinating court appearances, including pretrial conferences and dep-
ositions, for all witnesses who are subpoenaed in criminal cases, including law
enforcement personnel.
(2) Contacting witnesses and securing information necessary to place a wit-
ness on an on-call status with regard to his court appearance.
(3) Contacting witnesses to advise them not to report to court in the event
the case for which they have been subpoenaed has been continued or has had a
plea entered, or in the event there is any other reason why their attendance is
not required on the dates they have been ordered to report.
(4) Contacting the employer of a witness, when necessary, to confirm that
the employee has been subpoenaed to appear in court as a witness.
In addition, the office may provide additional services to reduce time and wage losses to a
minimum for all witnesses. FLA. STAT. § 43.35 (1983).
149. Id. at § 43.35(1).
150. FLA. STAT. § 43.26 (1983).
151. Section 43.26(6) of the Florida Statutes (1983) authorizes the employment of an
"executive assistant to the presiding judge [of each judicial circuit] who shall perform such
duties as the presiding judge may direct." Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(d) similarly
states that "fain executive assistant may be selected by a majority of the circuit judges and
shall perform such duties as the chief judge may direct." The supreme court adopted the
Rules of Judicial Administration in 1978. In re Florida Rules of Judicial Admin., 360 So. 2d
1076, 1076, 1081 (Fla. 1978).
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tern of sentencing guidelines.152 Although the preamble to the stat-
ute states that "[tihe provision of criminal penalties and of
limitations upon the application of such penalties is a matter of
predominantly substantive law and, as such, is a matter properly
addressed by the legislature," ' Iss it fails to mention that the imposi-
tion of sentences is a judicial function. 15' Section 921.001(4)(a) of
the Florida Statutes directed the supreme court to develop state-
wide sentencing guidelines by September 1, 1983.'15 The court's ac-
ceptance and application of the legislature's sentencing guideline
rule precluded any confrontation concerning legislative encroach-
ment upon the judiciary's rulemaking power.1" The court appar-
ently recognized the principle that "[u]nlike interpreting the Con-
stitution or adjudicating disputes, sentencing is not inherently or
exclusively a judicial function. 15 7
152. Section 921.001 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(1) The provision of crimial penalties and limitations upon the application
of such penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law and, as such, is a
matter properly addressed by the Legislature. The Legislature, in the exercise of
its authority to establish sentencing criteria and to provide for the imposition of
criminal penalties, has determined that it is in the best interest of the state to
develop, implement, and revise a uniform sentencing policy in cooperation with
the Supreme Court. In furtherance of this cooperative effort, there is created a
Sentencing Commission which shall be responsible for the initial development of
a statewide system of sentencing guidelines. After final development of a sen-
tencing guidelines system by the Supreme Court, the commission shall evaluate
these guidelines periodically and recommend such changes on a continuing basis
as are necessary to ensure certainty of punishment as well as fairness to offend-
ers and to citizens of the state.
FLA. STAT. § 921.001 (1983).
153. Id. at § 921.001(1).'
154. See Rhynes v. State, 312 So. 2d 520, 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) ("[ajppellant con-
fuses the legislative function of prescribing penalties and the judicial function of imposing
them."); see also State v. Benitez, 395 So. 2d 514, 519 (Fla. 1981) ("'[sjo long as a statute
does not wrest from courts the final discretion to impose sentence, it does not infringe upon
the constitutional division of responsibilities'") (emphasis in original) (citing People v. Ea-
son, 40 N.Y.2d 297, 301, 386 N.Y.S.2d 673, 676, 353 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1976)).
155. FLA. STAT. § 921.001(4)(a) (1983).
156. In re Rules of Criminal Procedure (sentencing guidelines), 439 So. 2d 848, 849
(Fla. 1983). The court subsequently modified the rule in The Florida Bar: Amendment to
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 451 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1984). The Florida Legislature then
amended §§ 921.001(4) and 921.001(7) of the Florida Statutes (1983) to conform to the su-
preme court's modification. Sentencing Guidelines, 1984 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 62, ch. 84-328
(West). The supreme court apparently has not questioned the legislature's requirement that
the office of the state court's administrator act as the staff for the sentencing commission to
"provide all necessary data collection, analysis, and research and support services." FLA.
STAT. § 921.001(2)(e) (1983).
157. Geraghty v. United States Parole Comm'n, 719 F.2d 1199, 1211 (3d Cir. 1983) (ci-
tation omitted).
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d. Alimony, Support, and Other Matters
The supreme court has accepted a legislative mandate requir-
ing the collection of support and alimony payments through a
court central depository. 168 The number of jurors required to try
various offenses is also the subject of a statute and rule.'5 9 The
supreme court also shares authority with the legislative and execu-
tive branches of government with respect to the judicial adminis-
trative commission, 1 0 judicial qualifications commission, 1 judicial
nomination commission, 1 2  and other matters."' The court has
158. In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204, 205
(Fla. 1973).
159. See FLA. STAT. § 913.10 (1983) and FL. R. CRIM. P. 3.270 ("[t]welve persons shall
constitute a jury to try all capital cases, and six persons shall constitute a jury to try all
other criminal cases"); see also Hearns v. State, 223 So. 2d 738, 739 (Fla. 1969) (Florida
provides for the number of jurors required to try cases by both statute and rule; the federal
Constitution guarantees an impartial jury trial, but not a definite number of jurors).
160. FLA. STAT. § 43.16 (1983).
161. FLA. STAT. § 43.20 (1983).
162. FLA. STAT. § 43.29 (1983). The court recognizes both legislative and administrative
roles in the appointment of judges. See In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d
25, 29-30 (Fla. 1973), which states:
The appointment of a judge is an executive function and the screening of appli-
cants which results in the nomination of those qualified is also an executive
function. It is the prerogative of the Legislature to provide for the number of
persons to serve on each judicial nominating commission and the method of
their selection. Once the judicial nominating commissions have been established
by the Legislature they become a part of the executive branch of government.
The function of the commissions being inherently an executive function, such
cannot be limited by legislative action.
Id.
163. Another recent act of the legislature permits shared authority, between the execu-
tive and judicial branches of government, to revoke driver licenses. Section 322.28(2) of the
Florida Statutes states:
(2) In a prosecution for a violation of a. 316.193 or s. 316. 1931, the following
provisions apply:
(a) Upon conviction of the driver, the court, along with imposing sentence,
shall revoke the driver's license or driving privilege of the person so convicted
and shall prescribe the period of such revocation in accordance with the follow-
ing provisions:
1. Upon first conviction for a violation of the provisions of s. 316.193 or s.
316.1931, except a violation of a. 316.1931(2) resulting in death, the driver's li-
cense or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 180 days or more
than 1 year.
2. Upon a second conviction within a period of 5 years from the date of a
prior conviction for a violation of the provisions of s. 316.193 or s. 316.1931 or a
combination of such sections, the driver's license or driving privilege shall be
revoked for not less than 5 years.
3. Upon a third conviction within a period of 10 years from the date of
conviction of the first of three or more convictions for the violation of the provi-
sions of s. 316.193 or s. 316.1931 or a combination of such sections, the driver's
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thus promoted harmony between the branches of government by
not challenging legislative authority in matters that are not clearly
procedural. One wonders, however, if any matters are clearly pro-
cedural or substantive.
4. CASES INVOLVING SEPARATION OF POWERS CONFRONTATIONS WITH
THE LEGISLATURE OVER RULEMAKING
This section examines the cases reflecting confrontations be-
tween the legislature and the supreme court. Because the legisla-
ture has control over substantive matters, and the judiciary has
authority over procedural matters, the separation of powers doc-
trine again becomes the focal point of discussion. The relevant
cases involve the distinction between substantive and procedural
law and involve situations where the courts sought to protect judi-
cial functions from legislative encroachment. It is difficult, if not
impossible, to extract from these cases a rule of law that reconciles
their outcomes.
a. Power to Admit Defendant to Bail Pending Appeal
In State ex rel. Harrington v. Genung,164 conflict arose be-
tween the judiciary and the legislature over the meaning of a stat-
ute that provided that a defendant in custody, whose case is stayed
pending appeal, "shall be released on his own recognizance ... if
he is charged with a bailable offense." '65 The Second District Court
license or driving privilege shall be revoked for not less than 10 years.
For the purposes of this paragraph, a previous conviction outside this state for a
violation of any alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense substantially simi-
lar to the offense of driving under the influence as proscribed by s. 316.193 will
be considered a previous conviction for violation of s. 316.193, and a conviction
for a violation of former s. 316.028 or former s. 860.01 is considered a conviction
for violation of s. 316.193 or s. 316.1931, respectively.
FLA. STAT. § 322.28(2)(a) (Supp. 1985).
Also, the court avoided confrontation in the interpretation of a statute that provided
for the review of waiver orders of a juvenile court judge. In re R. J. B. v. State, 408 So. 2d
1048, 1049 (Fla. 1982). The supreme court held that the statute did not invade the court's
rulemaking authority to allow an interlocutory appeal from a waiver order. If the legislature
had intended to create such a right of interlocutory appeal, it would have been an improper
exercise of legislative authority under the Florida Constitution. Id. at 1050; cf. In re Clarifi-
cation of Florida Rules of Practice and Procedure, 281 So. 2d at 204 ("The Legislature has
the constitutional right to repeal any rule of the Supreme Court by a two-thirds vote, but it
has no constitutional authority to enact any law relating to practice and procedure.") (foot-
note omitted).
164. 300 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
165. FLA. STAT. § 924.071(2) (1983). The statute provides:
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of Appeal interpreted the word "shall" to be directory and not
mandatory in nature.166 The court noted that the power to admit
to bail is a judicial power that must be free from encroachment by
the legislative branch of government.'" If the court gave the legis-
lative provision mandatory effect, it would be permitting legislative
encroachment upon judicial power. To safeguard this system of
separation of powers, "the preservation of the inherent powers of
the three branches must be free from encroachment or infringe-
ment by one upon the other.' 68
In the companion case of Bamber v. State,'" the second dis-
trict considered the effect of a statute that provided that "[n]o
person may be admitted to bail upon appeal from a conviction of a
felony if such person has previously been convicted of a felony
.... ,7 The court decided that the mandatory requirement of
the statute was in apparent conflict with a court rule that allowed
the court discretion to deny bail to "[a] person ... upon appeal
from a conviction of a felony if such person had previously been
convicted of a felony.' '  The court held that the entitlement to
bail was not a substantive matter within the purview of the legisla-
ture, but was a procedural matter within the discretion of the
court.' 72 Because the right to bail was procedural, the legislature
An appeal by the state from a pretrial order shall stay the case against each
defendant upon whose application the order was made until the appeal is deter-
mined. If the trial court determines that the evidence, confession, or admission
that is the subject of the order would materially assist the state in proving its
case against another defendant and the prosecuting attorney intends to use it for
that purpose, the court shall stay the case of that defendant until the appeal is
determined. A defendant in custody whose case is stayed either automatically or
by order of the court shall be released on his own recognizance pending the ap-
peal if he is charged with a bailable offense.
Id.
166. Genung, 300 So. 2d at 272. Construing the statute as merely directory, and not
mandatory, allowed the court to hold the statute constitutional. It has long been the policy
of the supreme court to construe such mandatory language as permissive rather than declare
a statute to be unconstitutional. Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. 1968). It should be
noted that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.140(e)(2) allows the court discretion in
permitting a defendant to be released on his own recognizance pending appeal by the state,
and is consistent with Genung ("An incarcerated defendant charged with a bailable offense
shall on motion be released on his own recognizance pending an appeal by the state, unless
the lower tribunal for good cause stated in an order determines otherwise.") FLA. R. APP. P.
9.140(e)(2) (emphasis added).
167. Genung, 300 So. 2d at 272.
168. Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 336 So. 2d 93, 94-95 (Fla. 1976).
169. 300 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
170. FLA. STAT. § 903.132 (1974).
171. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.691(a).
172. 300 So. 2d at 270.
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could not deprive the court of its discretion to grant bail.' Subse-
quently, however, the legislature passed an act that repealed the
rule insofar as it was inconsistent with -the provisions of section
903.132 of the Florida Statutes.17 4 In 1977, the supreme court
amended the rule to conform with the provisions of section 903.132
as amended. 7 6
b. Power to Require a Presentence Investigation
In Huntley v. State,'17 the court considered whether it should
follow the mandatory language of a statute 7 7 that required a
presentence investigation in felony cases, or the permissive lan-
guage of a supreme court rule that allowed for judicial discre-
tion. 7  The court declared that to the extent the statute
mandatorily requires a presentence investigation in felony cases,
the statute unconstitutionally invades the rulemaking power of the
supreme court.179 Therefore, the judicial rule controlled rather
than the statute.1 80
c. Power to Immunize an Attorney From Disciplinary
Proceedings
In Ciravolo v. The Florida Bar,'s' the court held that a statute
providing for a grant of immunity to witnesses testifying in certain
prosecutions did not immunize an attorney from disciplinary pro-
ceedings because the Florida Constitution gives exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the admission and discipline of attorneys to the supreme
173. Id.; see also Rolle v. State, 314 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975) (trial court had
discretion to grant bail pending appeal from felony conviction on the basis that a statute
denying bail to a convicted felon appealing a subsequent felony conviction conflicted with a
rule of criminal procedure that permitted discretion in such circumstances).
174. 1976 Fla. Laws 246.
175. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 343 So. 2d 1247, 1262 (Fla. 1977).
176. 339 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1976).
177. FLA. STAT. § 921.231 (1974).
178. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.710 provides:
In all cases in which the court has discretion as to what sentence may be im-
posed, the court may refer the case to the probation and parole commission for
investigation and recommendation. No sentence or sentences other than proba-
tion shall be imposed on any defendant found guilty of a first felony offense or
found guilty of a felony while under the age of 18 years, until after such investi-
gation has first been made and the recommendations of the commission received
and considered by the sentencing judge.
179. Rhynes, 312 So. 2d at 521.
180. Id.
181. 361 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 1978).
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court.18 2
d. Commencement of Action
The distinction between substance and procedure was the fo-
cus of Lundstrom v. Lyon, 8' where a common law complaint was
filed with the clerk within the two-year limitation period provided
by court rule of procedure, but where original process was not
placed in the sheriff's hands until after the expiration of the two-
year period. " A statute, that provided that an action is com-
menced for "limitation purposes" when process is delivered to the
sheriff for service, barred the action. 8' The supreme court decided
that the statute did not conflict with the rule of procedure, which
provided that an action is commenced for "procedural purposes"
when filed with the clerk.'" In a display of judicial comity toward
the legislature, the court reasoned that it could not, by its inherent
rulemaking authority, amend or abrogate a right resting in either
substantive or adjective law.18 7
e. Other Matters
In Rich v. Ryals,'" the supreme court held that the legislature
lacks the authority to mandate a court of equity to issue an injunc-
tion. 189 Rather than declare such legislation unconstitutional, the
court simply chose to interpret the word "shall" in a statute pur-
porting to require the issuance of an injunction as permissive
rather than mandatory.' 9"
Because the joinder or severance of parties during the course
of a trial is a matter of procedure, any statutory provision on the
subject would invade the supreme court's exclusive authority over
rulemaking."'
182. Id. at 124-25.
183. 86 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1956).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 772.
186. Lundstrom, 86 So. 2d at 772.
187. Id.
188. 212 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1968).
189. Id. at 643.
190. Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d at 643.
191. Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978); Bryant v. School Bd., 399 So. 2d
417 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Contra Van Bibber v. Hartford, 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983).
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C. Other Inherent Powers of the Courts Involving No
Substantial Separation of Powers Dispute
Many cases involve situations where the Florida judiciary ex-
ercised its inherent powers with no substantial separation of pow-
ers confrontation with another branch of government. In these
cases the judiciary made use of its inherent powers for important
judicial purposes. Inherent powers have thus been utilized to as-
sure the efficient performance of judicial functions, to protect a
court's dignity and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effec-
tive.1"2 The Florida courts have the inherent power to punish for
contempt, 98 to determine their own jurisdiction, 94 to enforce judg-
ments, 195 to enforce collection of judgments,9'e to vacate judg-
ments,1 7 to set aside satisfaction of judgments,9 8 to appoint pro-
cess servers,199 to appoint co-counsel to represent insolvent
criminal defendants, 20 0 to change venue when deemed necessary to
secure a fair trial, 0' to instruct a jury on maximum and minimum
penalties in a criminal trial,02 to direct a verdict of not guilty and
192. See Crataley, supra note 40, at 2. Some of the cases that discussed in this section
involve the use of inherent powers that subsequently have been promulgated and have be-
come the subject of express provisions in the Florida Constitution, a court rule, or a legisla-
tive enactment.
193. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (a court cannot dispense
with the power to fine for contempt); Demetree v. State, 89 So. 2d 498, 501 (Fla. 1956); In re
Associate Justice Pearson, 8 Fla. 496 (1859) (the power to fine for contempt exists to pre-
vent interference with the administration of justice). Florida recognizes the power by both
statute and court rule. See FLA. STAT. § 38.22 (1983); FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.830, 3.840.
194. Sun Insurance Co. v. Boyd, 105 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 1958).
195. Broadband Eng'g, Inc. v. Quality RF Services, Inc., 450 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1984).
196. Florida Medical Center, Inc. v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022, 1030 (Fla. 4th DCA
1983).
197. Skipper v. Schumacker, 118 Fla. 867, 873, 160 So. 357, 359 (1935).
198. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Simmons, 421 So. 2d 698, 700 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
199. Both section 48.021(2) of the Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.070(b) govern who will serve process. In Bradley Fiduciary Corp. v. Citizens and S. Int'l
Bank, 431 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the court held that because the manner of
service of process is a procedural matter, to the extent that a statute conflicts with a rule,
the rule prevails.
200. Dade County v. Goldstein, 384 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
201. Board of Pub. Instruction v. First Nat'l Bank, 111 Fla. 4, 11-12, 143 So. 738, 741
(1932).
202. The Florida courts once had the inherent power to charge on maximum and mini-
mum penalties. E.g., Simmons v. State, 36 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1948). Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3 .390(a) supplanted the court's inherent power in this area. See Tascano v. State,
393 So. 2d 540, 541 (Fla. 1981) (upon the request of either party, it is mandatory that the
court give instructions on maximum and minimum penalties); accord Thomas v. State, 419
So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1982).
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to set aside a jury verdict in a criminal trial,0 3 to appoint an acting
state attorney,2 °0 to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, 0' to
impose the sanction of dismissal for failure to comply with a court
order,2 06 to impose the sanction of dismissal as a coercive mea-
sure,20 7 to strike a voluntary dismissal,20 8 to dismiss an appeal,2 0 9 to
dismiss or decline jurisdiction on the basis of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, 21 0 to revoke probation,2 11 to seal court records, 12
to revoke the probate of a will,21 3 to correct errors,2 14 to reform
written instruments,211 to re-establish court records,21 6 to modify
203. State v. Shiver, 174 So. 2d 778, 779 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965).
204. A circuit judge has inherent, as well as statutory, authority to appoint an acting
state attorney in state court cases where the state attorney refuses or is unable or disquali-
fied to act. See State ex rel. Shevin v. Weinstein, 353 So. 2d 1251, 1253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978);
King v. State, 43 Fla. 211, 221, 31 So. 254, 257 (1901); FLA. STAT. § 27.16 (1983).
205. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420. It is worth noting that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.420(e) also precludes a trial court from exercising its inherent power to dismiss an action
for failure to prosecute if there is record activity within one year prior to the dismissal. See,
e.g., Bair v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 387 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
206. Mazer v. Jefferson Stores, Inc., 412 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (failure to com-
ply with an order requiring the plaintiff to answer certain questions on deposition); War-
riner v. Ferraro, 177 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965) (failure to comply with a court order to
furnish names of witnesses to defendants).
207. Pinakatt v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 394 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (dismissal for
failure to comply with discovery order); Watson v. Peskoe, 407 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA
1981) (failure to comply with discovery order justifies dismissal); In re Estate of Ulm, 345
So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (failure to perfect service of process insufficient for
dismissal).
208. Chapnick v. Hare, 394 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Select Builders, Inc. v.
Wong, 367 So. 2d 1089 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
209. Dasher v. State, 291 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974) (a court has the express, as
well as the inherent, power to dismiss an appeal that is improperly prosecuted).
210. Even though a trial court may have statutory jurisdiction to hear a matter, the
court has the inherent power to decline jurisdiction based upon the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, where in the interest of justice and the convenience of the litigants, the cause
should be heard in another forum. The doctrine's application rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court tempered by the time-honored concept of "the interest of justice." Hous-
ton v. Caldwell, 347 So. 2d 1041 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.
501 (1947).
211. State v. Stafford, 432 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Martin v. State, 243 So. 2d
189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Bronson v. State, 3 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1941). In a probation revoca-
tion proceeding, the trial court has the inherent power to decide what is reasonable. Cuciak
v. State, 410 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1982).
212. Johnson v. State, 336 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1976).
213. See In re Warner's Estate, 160 Fla. 460, 462, 35 So. 2d 296, 298 (1948).
214. Sheriff of Alachua County v. Hardie, 433 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (a court
has the inherent power to order restitution of property or damages when its judgment is
reversed on appeal, vacated, or set aside).
215. Tri-County Produce Distrib., Inc. v. Northeast Prod. Credit Ass'n, 160 So. 2d 46
(Fla. 1st DCA 1963).
216. State ex rel. Broward v. Edmunds, 114 Fla. 443, 153 So. 850 (1934) (where records
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and clarify court orders,1 to award attorney's fees against an at-
torney in correcting a scrivener's error in a final judgment,1 s to
enter judgments nunc pro tunc,11 to impose dress requirements,"'
to require judicial consent for the withdrawal of attorneys,""1 to
prohibit future pro se appearances in court,"'2 to protect minor
children,"23 to entertain matters pertaining to child custody," 4 to
award exclusive occupancy of a marital home in divorce proceed-
ings, 225 to award temporary relief," 6 to prevent abuse of judicial
procedure," 7 to exclude the testimony of expert witnesses,"28 to is-
sue writs of ne exeat,"' to control the conduct of proceedings,2 0 to
are lost or destroyed).
217. Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); American Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Saga Dev. Corp., 362 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Buckmas-
ter, 256 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959); Florida Indus. Comm'n v. Ebner, 111 So. 2d 79 (Fla.
3d DCA 1959). But see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.530, 1.540 (limiting a trial court's inherent power to
alter or modify final judgments).
218. See Sanchez v. Sanchez, 435 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980) (federal courts have the inherent power to assess attorney
fees for bad faith in the conduct of litigation - the Florida courts have not yet addressed this
issue).
219. See Jaris v. Tucker, 414 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Becker v. King, 307 So.
2d 855 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). This general principle does not apply in actions for the dissolu-
tion of marriage. Messana v. Messana, 421 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
220. Sanstrom v. State, 309 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975) (this is based on the court's
inherent power to regulate attorneys' professional conduct).
221. Fisher v. State, 248 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1971).
222. Platel v. Maquire, Voorhis & Wells, P.A., 436 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
(where the court was inundated with voluminous, incomprehensible documents necessitating
an "unreasonable" amount of time and effort to decipher, the appellant was prohibited from
proceeding further unless represented by an attorney).
223. A court of chancery has the inherent jurisdiction to control, protect, and provide
for minor children and their property. See, e.g., Cone v. Cone, 62 So. 2d 907, 908 (Fla. 1953);
Pollack v. Pollack, 159 Fla. 224, 31 So. 2d 253, 254 (1947); State Dep't of Health & Rehab.
Serv. v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Phillips v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co.,
347 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Cooper v. Cooper, 194 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 2d DCA
1967); Peppard v. Peppard, 198 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
224. Golstein v. Golstein, 442 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
225. McDonald v. McDonald, 368 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1979); Davies v. Davies, 345 So. 2d
817 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
226. Campbell v. Campbell, 436 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
227. Nation v. Nation, 404 So. 2d 394 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
228. Brevard County v. Interstate Eng'g Co., 224 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (a
trial court has the inherent authority to insist upon compliance with any pretrial require-
ments reasonably designed to expedite litigation).
229. State ex rel. Perky v. Browne, 105 Fla. 631, 142 So. 247 (1932) (a court of equity
has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent a person from leaving the jurisdiction until he gives
security for his appearance in the performance of a decree).
230. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982) (no first
amendment protection of the right of the press or the public to attend a pretrial suppression
hearing); State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 1976)
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protect a defendant in a criminal trial from inherently prejudicial
influences that threaten fairness,231 to preserve order and decorum
in the courtroom,32 to protect the rights of the parties and wit-
nesses, 23 3 to guarantee to litigants the fundamental right to a fair
trial,84 and generally to further the administration of justice.
IV. CONCLUSION
Article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution requires that
"[t]he courts shall be open to every person for redress of any in-
jury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or de-
lay." The protection of human rights and the security of our insti-
tutions require the independence of the courts. The invocation of
the inherent powers doctrine is crucial, particularly when the judi-
cial function at issue is the safeguarding of fundamental human
rights that the Florida Constitution guarantees.
The inherent powers doctrine, which is similar to the doctrine
of separation of powers, maintains the functional integrity of each
branch of government. The doctrine provides that when a constitu-
tion or statute gives a general power, or enjoins a duty, it also
grants by implication every particular power necessary for the ex-
ercise of the one or the performance of the other.2" The doctrine
may be utilized to fill in the gaps of the express provisions of law.
It helps the courts respond to practical problems that the express
provisions of the constitution, legislative acts, and court rules do
not contemplate; and it assists each department of government in
carrying out those responsibilities that naturally fall within the
scope of its authority.
There are gray areas where a certain function does not clearly
belong to any particular branch of government. In those areas
there is a functional overlap where authority is shared. In such in-
stances the inherent powers doctrine may assist each department
of government to carry out its mandated responsibilities.
The inherent powers doctrine enables the judiciary to carry
(this right of control over proceedings does not extend to court actions that constitute a
prior restraint on constitutionally privileged publications (court could not prohibit press
from publishing certain information about securities fraud case)).
231. McIntosh, 340 So. 2d at 909.
232. State ex rel. Gore Newspapers Co. v. Tyson, 313 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
233. Id.
234. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 426 So. 2d 1, 3.
235. Id.; Gore Newspaper Co., 313 So. 2d at 782.
236. State ex rel. Ross v. Call, 39 Fla. 504, 22 So. 748 (1897) (explaining the inherent
power of the court to adopt necessary rules of practice).
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out its constitutional responsibilities as a court. It permits the per-
formance of functions not expressly provided by law. The use of
inherent powers, however, must be balanced so as not to invade
the spheres of authority of the other branches of government. The
system of checks and balances, like the inherent powers doctrine,
protects the functional integrity of each branch of government and
prevents encroachments of power. It prevents the tyrannical usur-
pation of power by a single branch of government. The few cases of
confrontations among the branches of government reflect the coop-
eration that maintains the orderly functioning of government.
Although the Florida Constitution articulates a theoretical
separation of powers among the three branches of government, the
scope of authority of each branch is not realistically divisible.
Thus, the orderly operation of government requires the "separate-
ness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity, '23 7 of its
branches. In particular, it requires that the judiciary use its inher-
ent powers sparingly so as not to invade the constitutional sphere
of authority of the other branches. The cases involving confronta-
tions between the judiciary and the legislature, in which the court
defers to the authority of the legislature, manifest the court's pru-
dent use of its "inherent power."238
237. Girardeau v. State, 403 So. 2d 513, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (quoting Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1964) and United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 707 (1974)).
238. In Kirk v. Baker, 229 So. 2d 250, 252-53 (Fla. 1969), the court stated:
Unquestionably the dearth of authority is occasioned by the fact that the respec-
tive branches of government in our country have throughout our history assidu-
ously avoided any encroachment on one another's authority. In those few in-
stance where difficult cases have arisen, each branch has had enough foresight
and respect for the orderly functioning of the governmental processes to avoid a
confrontation.
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